From 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2011 15:09:01 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
index 376f22130791..326f0a2d56e5 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
- if (namelen > 32)
+ if (len > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, command, char __user *, buf, long, count)
down_read(&uts_sem);
res = sysinfo_table[offset];
len = strlen(res)+1;
- if (len > count)
+ if ((unsigned long)len > (unsigned long)count)
len = count;
if (copy_to_user(buf, res, len))
err = -EFAULT;
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer,
return 1;
case GSI_GET_HWRPB:
- if (nbytes < sizeof(*hwrpb))
+ if (nbytes > sizeof(*hwrpb))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1008,6 +1008,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, int __user *, ustatus, int, options,
{
struct rusage r;
long ret, err;
+ unsigned int status = 0;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
if (!ur)
@@ -1016,13 +1017,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, int __user *, ustatus, int, options,
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
- ret = sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, (struct rusage __user *) &r);
+ ret = sys_wait4(pid, (unsigned int __user *) &status, options,
+ (struct rusage __user *) &r);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ur, sizeof(*ur)))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
+ err |= put_user(status, ustatus);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_sec);
--
GitLab