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  1. Aug 20, 2013
    • David Vrabel's avatar
      x86/xen: do not identity map UNUSABLE regions in the machine E820 · 3bc38cbc
      David Vrabel authored
      
      If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will
      attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel
      will crash.
      
      There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0
      kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and
      treat it as RAM.
      
      We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up.
      A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map
      and would need to be handled in another patch.
      
      This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot.
      
      tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel
      would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable
      regions to be mapped by guests.
      
        (XEN)  0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable)
        (XEN)  0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved)
        (XEN)  0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable)
        (XEN)  0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable)
        (XEN)  0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable)
      
      tboot marked this region as unusable.
      
        (XEN)  0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable)
        (XEN)  00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved)
        (XEN)  00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data)
        (XEN)  00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved)
        (XEN)  00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved)
        (XEN)  00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved)
        (XEN)  0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable)
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
      [v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      3bc38cbc
  2. Jun 28, 2013
  3. Jun 10, 2013
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/time: Free onlined per-cpu data structure if we want to online it again. · 09e99da7
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      If the per-cpu time data structure has been onlined already and
      we are trying to online it again, then free the previous copy
      before blindly over-writting it.
      
      A developer naturally should not call this function multiple times
      but just in case.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      09e99da7
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/time: Check that the per_cpu data structure has data before freeing. · a05e2c37
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      We don't check whether the per_cpu data structure has actually
      been freed in the past. This checks it and if it has been freed
      in the past then just continues on without double-freeing.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      a05e2c37
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/time: Don't leak interrupt name when offlining. · c9d76a24
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      When the user does:
          echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
          echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
      
      kmemleak reports:
      kmemleak: 7 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
      
      One of the leaks is from xen/time:
      
      unreferenced object 0xffff88003fa51280 (size 32):
        comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294667339 (age 1027.789s)
        hex dump (first 32 bytes):
          74 69 6d 65 72 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  timer1..........
          00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
        backtrace:
          [<ffffffff81660721>] kmemleak_alloc+0x21/0x50
          [<ffffffff81190aac>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0xec/0x2a0
          [<ffffffff812fe1bb>] kvasprintf+0x5b/0x90
          [<ffffffff812fe228>] kasprintf+0x38/0x40
          [<ffffffff81041ec1>] xen_setup_timer+0x51/0xf0
          [<ffffffff8166339f>] xen_cpu_up+0x5f/0x3e8
          [<ffffffff8166bbf5>] _cpu_up+0xd1/0x14b
          [<ffffffff8166bd48>] cpu_up+0xd9/0xec
          [<ffffffff81ae6e4a>] smp_init+0x4b/0xa3
          [<ffffffff81ac4981>] kernel_init_freeable+0xdb/0x1e6
          [<ffffffff8165ce39>] kernel_init+0x9/0xf0
          [<ffffffff8167edfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
          [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
      
      This patch fixes it by stashing away the 'name' in the per-cpu
      data structure and freeing it when offlining the CPU.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      c9d76a24
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/time: Encapsulate the struct clock_event_device in another structure. · 31620a19
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      We don't do any code movement. We just encapsulate the struct clock_event_device
      in a new structure which contains said structure and a pointer to
      a char *name. The 'name' will be used in 'xen/time: Don't leak interrupt
      name when offlining'.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      31620a19
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/spinlock: Don't leak interrupt name when offlining. · 354e7b76
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      When the user does:
      echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
      echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
      
      kmemleak reports:
      kmemleak: 7 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
      
      unreferenced object 0xffff88003fa51260 (size 32):
        comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294667339 (age 1027.789s)
        hex dump (first 32 bytes):
          73 70 69 6e 6c 6f 63 6b 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  spinlock1.......
          00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
        backtrace:
          [<ffffffff81660721>] kmemleak_alloc+0x21/0x50
          [<ffffffff81190aac>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0xec/0x2a0
          [<ffffffff812fe1bb>] kvasprintf+0x5b/0x90
          [<ffffffff812fe228>] kasprintf+0x38/0x40
          [<ffffffff81663789>] xen_init_lock_cpu+0x61/0xbe
          [<ffffffff816633a6>] xen_cpu_up+0x66/0x3e8
          [<ffffffff8166bbf5>] _cpu_up+0xd1/0x14b
          [<ffffffff8166bd48>] cpu_up+0xd9/0xec
          [<ffffffff81ae6e4a>] smp_init+0x4b/0xa3
          [<ffffffff81ac4981>] kernel_init_freeable+0xdb/0x1e6
          [<ffffffff8165ce39>] kernel_init+0x9/0xf0
          [<ffffffff8167edfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
          [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
      
      Instead of doing it like the "xen/smp: Don't leak interrupt name when offlining"
      patch did (which has a per-cpu structure which contains both the
      IRQ number and char*) we use a per-cpu pointers to a *char.
      
      The reason is that the "__this_cpu_read(lock_kicker_irq);" macro
      blows up with "__bad_size_call_parameter()" as the size of the
      returned structure is not within the parameters of what it expects
      and optimizes for.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      354e7b76
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/smp: Don't leak interrupt name when offlining. · b85fffec
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      When the user does:
      echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
      echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
      
      kmemleak reports:
      kmemleak: 7 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
      
      unreferenced object 0xffff88003fa51240 (size 32):
        comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294667339 (age 1027.789s)
        hex dump (first 32 bytes):
          72 65 73 63 68 65 64 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  resched1........
          00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
        backtrace:
          [<ffffffff81660721>] kmemleak_alloc+0x21/0x50
          [<ffffffff81190aac>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0xec/0x2a0
          [<ffffffff812fe1bb>] kvasprintf+0x5b/0x90
          [<ffffffff812fe228>] kasprintf+0x38/0x40
          [<ffffffff81047ed1>] xen_smp_intr_init+0x41/0x2c0
          [<ffffffff816636d3>] xen_cpu_up+0x393/0x3e8
          [<ffffffff8166bbf5>] _cpu_up+0xd1/0x14b
          [<ffffffff8166bd48>] cpu_up+0xd9/0xec
          [<ffffffff81ae6e4a>] smp_init+0x4b/0xa3
          [<ffffffff81ac4981>] kernel_init_freeable+0xdb/0x1e6
          [<ffffffff8165ce39>] kernel_init+0x9/0xf0
          [<ffffffff8167edfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
          [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
      
      This patch fixes some of it by using the 'struct xen_common_irq->name'
      field to stash away the char so that it can be freed when
      the interrupt line is destroyed.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      b85fffec
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/smp: Set the per-cpu IRQ number to a valid default. · ee336e10
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      When we free it we want to make sure to set it to a default
      value of -1 so that we don't double-free it (in case somebody
      calls us twice).
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      ee336e10
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/smp: Introduce a common structure to contain the IRQ name and interrupt line. · 9547689f
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      This patch adds a new structure to contain the common two things
      that each of the per-cpu interrupts need:
       - an interrupt number,
       - and the name of the interrupt (to be added in 'xen/smp: Don't leak
         interrupt name when offlining').
      
      This allows us to carry the tuple of the per-cpu interrupt data structure
      and expand it as we need in the future.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      9547689f
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/smp: Coalesce the free_irq calls in one function. · 53b94fdc
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      There are two functions that do a bunch of 'free_irq' on
      the per_cpu IRQ. Instead of having duplicate code just move
      it to one function.
      
      This is just code movement.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      53b94fdc
  4. May 29, 2013
    • Stefan Bader's avatar
      xen: Clean up apic ipi interface · 1db01b49
      Stefan Bader authored
      
      Commit f447d56d introduced the
      implementation of the PV apic ipi interface. But there were some
      odd things (it seems none of which cause really any issue but
      maybe they should be cleaned up anyway):
       - xen_send_IPI_mask_allbutself (and by that xen_send_IPI_allbutself)
         ignore the passed in vector and only use the CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE
         vector. While xen_send_IPI_all and xen_send_IPI_mask use the vector.
       - physflat_send_IPI_allbutself is declared unnecessarily. It is never
         used.
      
      This patch tries to clean up those things.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      1db01b49
  5. May 20, 2013
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time · 5e427ec2
      Linus Torvalds authored
      
      In commit 78d77df7 ("x86-64, init: Do not set NX bits on non-NX
      capable hardware") we added the early_pmd_flags that gets the NX bit set
      when a CPU supports NX. However, the new variable was marked __initdata,
      because the main _use_ of this is in an __init routine.
      
      However, the bit setting happens from secondary_startup_64(), which is
      called not only at bootup, but on every secondary CPU start.  Including
      resuming from STR and at CPU hotplug time.  So the value cannot be
      __initdata.
      
      Reported-bisected-and-tested-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9
      Acked-by: default avatarPeter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Fernando Luis Vázquez Cao <fernando@oss.ntt.co.jp>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5e427ec2
  6. May 14, 2013
    • John Stultz's avatar
      time: Revert ALWAYS_USE_PERSISTENT_CLOCK compile time optimizaitons · b4f711ee
      John Stultz authored
      
      Kay Sievers noted that the ALWAYS_USE_PERSISTENT_CLOCK config,
      which enables some minor compile time optimization to avoid
      uncessary code in mostly the suspend/resume path could cause
      problems for userland.
      
      In particular, the dependency for RTC_HCTOSYS on
      !ALWAYS_USE_PERSISTENT_CLOCK, which avoids setting the time
      twice and simplifies suspend/resume, has the side effect
      of causing the /sys/class/rtc/rtcN/hctosys flag to always be
      zero, and this flag is commonly used by udev to setup the
      /dev/rtc symlink to /dev/rtcN, which can cause pain for
      older applications.
      
      While the udev rules could use some work to be less fragile,
      breaking userland should strongly be avoided. Additionally
      the compile time optimizations are fairly minor, and the code
      being optimized is likely to be reworked in the future, so
      lets revert this change.
      
      Reported-by: default avatarKay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
      Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #3.9
      Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
      Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1366828376-18124-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
      
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      b4f711ee
  7. May 10, 2013
  8. May 09, 2013
  9. May 08, 2013
  10. May 07, 2013
  11. May 06, 2013
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      xen/vcpu/pvhvm: Fix vcpu hotplugging hanging. · 7f1fc268
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
      
      If a user did:
      
      	echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
      	echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
      
      we would (this a build with DEBUG enabled) get to:
      smpboot: ++++++++++++++++++++=_---CPU UP  1
      .. snip..
      smpboot: Stack at about ffff880074c0ff44
      smpboot: CPU1: has booted.
      
      and hang. The RCU mechanism would kick in an try to IPI the CPU1
      but the IPIs (and all other interrupts) would never arrive at the
      CPU1. At first glance at least. A bit digging in the hypervisor
      trace shows that (using xenanalyze):
      
      [vla] d4v1 vec 243 injecting
         0.043163027 --|x d4v1 intr_window vec 243 src 5(vector) intr f3
      ]  0.043163639 --|x d4v1 vmentry cycles 1468
      ]  0.043164913 --|x d4v1 vmexit exit_reason PENDING_INTERRUPT eip ffffffff81673254
         0.043164913 --|x d4v1 inj_virq vec 243  real
        [vla] d4v1 vec 243 injecting
         0.043164913 --|x d4v1 intr_window vec 243 src 5(vector) intr f3
      ]  0.043165526 --|x d4v1 vmentry cycles 1472
      ]  0.043166800 --|x d4v1 vmexit exit_reason PENDING_INTERRUPT eip ffffffff81673254
         0.043166800 --|x d4v1 inj_virq vec 243  real
        [vla] d4v1 vec 243 injecting
      
      there is a pending event (subsequent debugging shows it is the IPI
      from the VCPU0 when smpboot.c on VCPU1 has done
      "set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), true)") and the guest VCPU1 is
      interrupted with the callback IPI (0xf3 aka 243) which ends up calling
      __xen_evtchn_do_upcall.
      
      The __xen_evtchn_do_upcall seems to do *something* but not acknowledge
      the pending events. And the moment the guest does a 'cli' (that is the
      ffffffff81673254 in the log above) the hypervisor is invoked again to
      inject the IPI (0xf3) to tell the guest it has pending interrupts.
      This repeats itself forever.
      
      The culprit was the per_cpu(xen_vcpu, cpu) pointer. At the bootup
      we set each per_cpu(xen_vcpu, cpu) to point to the
      shared_info->vcpu_info[vcpu] but later on use the VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info
      to register per-CPU  structures (xen_vcpu_setup).
      This is used to allow events for more than 32 VCPUs and for performance
      optimizations reasons.
      
      When the user performs the VCPU hotplug we end up calling the
      the xen_vcpu_setup once more. We make the hypercall which returns
      -EINVAL as it does not allow multiple registration calls (and
      already has re-assigned where the events are being set). We pick
      the fallback case and set per_cpu(xen_vcpu, cpu) to point to the
      shared_info->vcpu_info[vcpu] (which is a good fallback during bootup).
      However the hypervisor is still setting events in the register
      per-cpu structure (per_cpu(xen_vcpu_info, cpu)).
      
      As such when the events are set by the hypervisor (such as timer one),
      and when we iterate in __xen_evtchn_do_upcall we end up reading stale
      events from the shared_info->vcpu_info[vcpu] instead of the
      per_cpu(xen_vcpu_info, cpu) structures. Hence we never acknowledge the
      events that the hypervisor has set and the hypervisor keeps on reminding
      us to ack the events which we never do.
      
      The fix is simple. Don't on the second time when xen_vcpu_setup is
      called over-write the per_cpu(xen_vcpu, cpu) if it points to
      per_cpu(xen_vcpu_info).
      
      Acked-by: default avatarStefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
      CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      7f1fc268
  12. May 05, 2013
  13. May 04, 2013
  14. May 03, 2013
  15. May 02, 2013
  16. May 01, 2013
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